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BABY, WE WERE BORN THIS WAY: THE CASE FOR
MAKING SEXUAL ORIENTATION A SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Jennifer R. Covais*

ABSTRACT
Currently, the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides minimal constitutional
safeguards against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Laws
that treat queer Americans differently than their straight counterparts
are presumptively constitutional if those laws bear a rational
relationship to any legitimate government interest. Consequently,
states may limit same-sex couples’ ability to adopt children, enjoy the
goods and services of certain businesses, and qualify for government
programs. The Supreme Court established enhanced equal protection
guarantees for classifications based on race, ethnicity, and national
origin which are deemed suspect classifications. These classifications
will only survive judicial review if the government proves the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.
Classifications based on race, ethnicity, or national origin rarely meet
this high legal burden, making it nearly impossible for states to
discriminate based on these protected categories. However, the
Supreme Court has never extended these protections to any other
category of people, despite having ample opportunity to do so.
*
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To achieve suspect classification status, the Court will ask
whether the particular group “(1) constitutes a discrete and insular
minority; (2) has suffered a history of discrimination; (3) is politically
powerless; (4) is defined by an immutable trait; and (5) is defined by a
trait that is generally irrelevant to one’s ability to function in society.”1
Sexual orientation meets all five categories based on the LGBTQ+
community’s longstanding history of oppressive government laws and
regulations, inability to exert significant power through the democratic
process, and the inability of a person’s sexual orientation to change.
This Note argues that the Court must now extend enhanced
constitutional protections to queer communities as the pillars of equal
protection jurisprudence demand it.

1

Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739,
742 (2014).
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INTRODUCTION

On June 15, 2015, LGBTQ+ Americans rejoiced upon learning
that the Supreme Court finally held that the right to marry the person
you love, regardless of their gender, is a fundamental right belonging
to all.2 Same-sex couples can now experience the union of marriage
to the same extent as their heterosexual peers. However, marriage
equality only solves one of a profusion of issues posed to queer
Americans.3 The Supreme Court has been reluctant, if not all out
defiant, to address these issues. 4 Beyond extending the fundamental
right to marry to queer people, the Supreme Court has heard only a
handful of cases challenging the constitutionality of state laws and
ordinances that either directly or indirectly target queer people. 5 Of
these cases, the Court has never extended heightened constitutional
protections to queer people, creating legal ambiguities as to what
protections, if any, are afforded to queer Americans.
The Court has attempted to apply the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to classifications based on sexual
orientation but has only awarded sexual orientation minimal
constitutional protections. The Equal Protection framework calls on
courts to consider whether the class of people affected by the statute
are members of a suspect, quasi-suspect, or non-suspect class.6 If the
intended class is suspect, then a court will apply the highest standard
of review: strict scrutiny.7 When a law treats groups differently based
on a suspect classification, that law will only survive strict scrutiny
review if the government shows the law is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. 8 Quasi-suspect classifications are
2

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
See Abhilasha Mandal, The Conversation Surrounding the Word ‘Queer’ is
Evolving,
THE
STATE
PRESS
(Sept.
9,
2020,
6:27
PM),
https://www.statepress.com/article/2020/09/specho-reclaiming-the-word-queerfrom-negative-association (for a discussion on the reclamation of the word “queer”
by members of the LGBTQ+ community). For the purposes of this Note, the word
“queer” will be used to refer to any person identifying with the LGBTQ+ community
in an effort to be inclusive of all possible identities held by those belonging to the
LGBTQ+ community.
4
Infra Part V.
5
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744 (2013).
6
Infra Section III.
7
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
8
Id.
3
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subject to intermediate scrutiny, where the government must show that
the law is substantially related to an important government purpose. 9
Finally, all other classifications are deemed to be non-suspect classes
and are presumed to be constitutional unless the challenger can show
the statute fails rational basis review; the law must only be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. 10
The Court has named sexual orientation as a non-suspect
classification, so it is only subject to rational basis review. Whenever
the Court struck down a statute classifying people based on sexual
orientation, the Court noted that the law was illegitimate because it was
predicated on the bare desire to harm queer people, or it lacked a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 11 Only the most
egregiously offensive statutes will fail to satisfy rational basis review
because under this standard, a law need only bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate purpose and almost all laws meet this
standard. Systemic homophobia is a part of American life: it rears its
ugly head in many areas of life including housing and employment
discrimination, the continuing existence of conversion therapy, and
more.12 Additionally, a majority of states have not enacted antidiscrimination statutes that seek to provide equal protection for queer
people.13 This reality creates an urgent need for heightened judicial
scrutiny on sexual orientation-based classifications to ensure that
governments are less likely to pass and enforce laws that are injurious
to their queer constituents.
The Court has only extended suspect status to classifications
made on race, ethnicity, and national origin. 14 The Court has
recognized something distinctly different about these groups that
entitle them to the highest degree of constitutional scrutiny. 15 To
determine if a group should become a suspect class, the Court will ask
9

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
10
Raphael Holosyzc- Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When
Does Rational Basis Bite? 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2015).
11
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
12
Infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
13
LGBTQ Americans Aren’t Fully Protected From Discrimination in 29 States,
FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS, https://freedomforallamericans.org/states/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021).
14
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
15
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/11

4

Covais: Baby, We Were Born This Way

2022

BABY, WE WERE BORN THIS WAY

287

whether the particular group “(1) constitutes a discrete and insular
minority; (2) has suffered a history of discrimination; (3) is politically
powerless; (4) is defined by an immutable trait; and (5) is defined by a
trait that is generally irrelevant to one’s ability to function in society.” 16
Sexual orientation meets each one of these factors similarly to that of
race, national origin, and ethnicity and thus, should become a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
This Note will be divided into six sections. Section II will
explore the inception of race and national origin as a suspect
classification and the early stages of the suspect classification
framework. Section III will discuss the modern equal protection
jurisprudence and how today’s courts would analyze an equal
protection claim. Section IV will explore the history of the queer
community and how the United States has failed to protect queer
people from harm, and at times, was the perpetrator of systemic
oppression of queer Americans. Section V will apply the modern equal
protection framework to the traits and realities of queer communities
across the country. This section will then explain how elevating sexual
orientation from a non-suspect classification to a suspect classification
will provide queer communities with the constitutional protections
they need to evade incessant and invidious discrimination. Finally,
Section VI will argue that the Supreme Court should now recognize
that sexual orientation meets all the criteria for strict scrutiny despite
its prolonged reluctance to do so. 17

16

Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739,
742 (2014).
17
This Note will only argue for the application of strict scrutiny analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment to classifications based on sexual orientation and not on
classifications based on gender identity. This is not to say that gender-based
discrimination is not worthy of growing litigation and legal scholarship, but merely
that classifications made on the basis of gender, specifically transgender identity,
falls squarely into legal tests created for quasi-suspect classifications and do not meet
the factors for qualifying as a suspect classifications. See generally, Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). Gender-based classifications are usually made on the basis of
an individual’s biological sex and such a distinction is based on gender stereotypes
and those classifications can only survive if they are substantially related to an
important government purpose. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. Thus, it follows that any
classification made on the basis of gender identity or gender would most successfully
be litigated under Craig.
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THE BEGINNINGS OF SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION: RACE AND
NATIONAL ORIGIN

In the 1950s, the Supreme Court expanded the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement
and struck down blatantly racist post-war laws and practices. 18 The
Fourteenth Amendment was understood to overturn the Dred Scott
decision19 by making all people born or naturalized within the United
States citizens of the United States. 20 The Fourteenth Amendment also
put an end to state authorized discrimination on the basis of race and
required black and white Americans to be treated equally under the
law.21 Beginning in the mid- twentieth century, the Court slowly
began to apply Carolene Products’22 “discrete and insular minorities”
test to state mandated race-based classifications.23
For the first time, in Korematsu v. United States,24 the Court
explicitly stated that all classifications based solely on race designed
to effectively curtail the civil liberties of racial minorities are subject
to “the most rigid scrutiny.”25 In Korematsu, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a government order that required JapaneseAmericans to move into relocation camps. 26 Immediately following
the attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, President Franklin
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 that required all Japanese-Americans to relocate to detention camps away from military bases on
the west coast in order to take necessary steps to “prevent espionage
and sabotage in an area threatened by Japanese attack.” 27 The
petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, refused to relocate
to the detention camps and was convicted in federal district court for
violating the order.28 The Court upheld the detention order on the
18

MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT 88 (2001) (ebook).
19
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
20
Id. at 54.
21
Id.
22
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
23
Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE L. J. 1807, 1818
(2017).
24
323 U.S. 214 (1945).
25
Id. at 216.
26
Id. at 221.
27
Id. at 217.
28
Id. at 215. There was no question raised at trial as to the petitioner’s loyalty to the
United States. Id.
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grounds that not all laws predicated on suspect classifications are
automatically unconstitutional because it may be that “pressing public
necessity” justifies the necessity for race-based classifications. 29
Here, the Court in Korematsu recognized that racial minorities
fall within the general meaning of Carolene Products’ “discrete and
insular minorities” due to the nation’s ugly history of racial oppression,
but incorrectly applied what the Court called “rigid scrutiny.” To
satisfy strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored so that it is not
underinclusive or overbroad. A law is overbroad and underinclusive
if it burdens unintended subjects of a law as well as the unintended
subjects far more than necessary to achieve the government’s
compelling purpose.30 The Court failed to identify the obvious
overinclusive and underinclusive nature of the exclusion order which
exemplifies a lack of narrow tailoring. 31
In Plessy v. Ferguson,32 the Court addressed race-based
classifications but did not state that racial discrimination was entitled
to any scrutiny, let alone “rigid scrutiny” like in Korematsu.33 the
Court upheld a Louisiana law that required “separate but equal” train
cars in which white passengers were to ride in one car and black
passengers were to ride in another. 34 The Court reasoned that society
at the time did not want white and black people to commingle in social
situations and the law only intended to effectuate this intent. 35 The
Court in Plessy did not see how the separation implied that one race
was inferior to the other, and held that there was no Fourteenth
Amendment violation as both races were treated equally under the
law.36 Nine years after Korematsu in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka,37 the Court finally struck down a race-based classification,
29

Id.
Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 837
(1978).
31
The president justified the exclusion order on the grounds that the United States
had an interest in preventing “espionage and sabotage” but failed to exclude GermanAmericans or Italian-Americans who may pose similar threats to national security,
rendering the act underinclusive. Id. at 240. The act is also overbroad because it
included children and elderly: groups who were unlikely to be a national security
threat. Id. at 243.
32
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 544.
36
Id.
37
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30
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schools segregated by race, even though the schools were “separate but
equal,” overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.38 In 1954, the Court finally
found segregation unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment
and held that “separate” was never actually “equal.”39 The Court in
Brown held that although white and black schools are physically and
structurally equal, segregated schools are inherently unequal because
separation in schools based solely on race impermissibly ostracizes
racial minorities by creating feelings of inferiority.40
In Loving v. Virginia,41 the Court struck down a law that
prohibited interracial marriage on the ground that such a law is facially
discriminatory because it draws distinctions based solely on race. 42
Relying on Korematsu,43 the Court recognized that the
antimiscegenation statute in Loving created a suspect classification
subject to the most rigid scrutiny. 44 The Court found “no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” to
justify the classification and restricting the right to marry solely based
on racial classifications violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 45
Loving established that classifications based on race that were
intended to burden racial minorities were subject to strict scrutiny. 46
Going forward, the Court was now tasked with applying strict scrutiny
to laws that intend to benefit racial minorities in affirmative action
cases throughout the rest of the twentieth century. 47 In the early cases,
the Court struggled with determining how and when strict scrutiny
should apply, but in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 48 the Court finally
decided that all race-based classifications must pass strict scrutiny in
which they “serve a compelling governmental interest, and [are]
narrowly tailored to further that interest” even when such legislation is
intended to help racial minorities.49
38

Id. at 493-94 (1954).
Id.
40
Id.
41
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42
Id. at 11.
43
Supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
44
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See generally, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
48
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
49
Id. at 235.
39
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THE MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND LEVELS
OF SCRUTINY

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in 1868,50 and requires that, “no State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 51
Congress proposed the Equal Protection Clause with the intention of
preventing state actors from discriminating on the basis of race either
covertly or overtly by requiring states to make and enforce laws that
applied to all people evenhandedly. 52 Before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, states could enact laws that discriminated
against nonwhites while simultaneously providing benefits for white
Americans.53
Between the late nineteenth century and 1938, the Court
entered a period of jurisprudence known as the Lochner era. 54 During
the Lochner era, the Court struck down numerous pieces of social
legislation on the ground that the freedom to contract trumped laws
that sought to protect individual rights.55 The Court held that the
freedom to contract was a fundamental right under the Constitution and
states could only limit this right pursuant to their police powers in
limited circumstances.56 In United States v. Carolene Products, 57 the
50

MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT 54 (2001) (ebook).
51
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.
52
PERRY, supra note 50, at 54.
53
PERRY, supra note 50, at 56. States frequently passed laws that made it easier to
obtain a criminal conviction against nonwhites than against whites. Id. States also
made it a crime to steal from, or to kill a white person but there was no crime for
stealing from or killing a nonwhite person. Id.
54
Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 107, 122-23 (1990). The Lochner Era earned its name from the landmark case,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which held that a state law that limited
the number of hours bakery employees could work in one week to sixty hours in one
week, and no more than ten hours in one day was unconstitutional. Id.; see also,
Joshua Waimberg, Lochner v. New York: Fundamental Rights and Economic
Liberty,
NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION
CTR.
(Oct.
26,
2015),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/lochner-v-new-york-fundamental-rights-andeconomic-liberty/. The Court reasoned that the state law did not “constitute a
legitimate exercise of state police powers” and instead interfered with employers’
and employees’ right to enter into employment contracts. Id.
55
Waimberg, supra note 54.
56
Id.
57
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Court marked the end of the Lochner era when it held that rather than
subject legislation challenging economic and freedom of contract
rights to heightened scrutiny, the Court would now apply rational basis
review.58 The Court explained that heightened scrutiny would still
apply in the following situations: (1) where a law or statute conflicts
with Bill of Rights protections, which was later recognized as
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution, (2) where the
political process has closed or is malfunctioning, and (3) where
regulations adversely affect “discrete and insular minorities.” 59
Following Carolene Products, the Court expanded the
heightened standard of review for Equal Protection Claims. Today,
the Court applies a consistent framework to all equal protection
claims.60 A plaintiff seeking to bring a claim for an alleged violation
of the Equal Protection Clause must first prove three procedural
requirements: (1), the court must have jurisdiction, (2), the claim must
be justiciable,61 and (3), the conduct giving rise to the claim must be
governmental action.62
Once the plaintiff successfully meets the necessary procedural
requirements, the plaintiff must show that the action has substantive
merit. To proceed on the merits, the claimant must show that a
government action places a burden or a benefit to the exclusion of
another class of citizens. 63 The Equal Protection Clause demands that
“government actors treat all similarly situated persons alike.”64 Under
Equal Protection analysis, government classifications fall into one of
two categories.
Government classification can be facially
discriminatory,65 or facially neutral but have a discriminatory intent
and effect.66 If the government used a classification to discriminate
58

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
Id. at 152 n.4.
60
Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 121, 123 (1989).
61
“The quality, state, or condition of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication
by a court.” Justiciability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
62
Galloway, supra note 60, at 123.
63
Id.
64
Cain Norris & Whitney Turk, Fourteenth Annual Gender and Sexuality Law:
Annual Review Article: Equal Protection, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 397, 399 (2013).
65
Id.; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that
statutes that explicitly require segregation of public schools solely on the basis of
race deprive children of the minority group of equal education opportunities).
66
Galloway, supra note 60, at 123; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (holding that a facially neutral statute may still violate the Fourteenth
59
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against a group, then the classification must be supported by a
sufficient justification. 67 Courts use varying tests known as “meansends scrutiny” to determine if the justification supported the
classification-based discrimination. 68 Government discrimination is
categorized into three classifications: suspect classifications, quasisuspect classifications, and non-suspect classifications.69
When the government discriminates against a person or a group
of people based on a suspect classification, that government action is
subject to strict scrutiny review by the court. 70 A classification is
suspect when the government discriminates on the basis of race,71
national origin,72 or ethnicity.73 To determine which groups shall be
classified as a suspect class, the Court will ask whether the particular
group “(1) constitutes a discrete and insular minority; (2) has suffered
a history of discrimination; (3) is politically powerless; (4) is defined
by an immutable trait; and (5) is defined by a trait that is generally
irrelevant to one’s ability to function in society.” 74 These questions
are not quite elements, but are factors to be considered rather than a
requirement to be fulfilled. 75 If the government discriminates on the
Amendment Equal Protection Clause only if the statute is shown to have both a
discriminatory effect on a particular race and is motivated by racial discrimination).
67
Galloway, supra note 60, at 123.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739,
743 (2014).
71
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court here struck down a state statute
that prohibited interracial marriage. Id. at 1. For the first time, the Court held that
statutes that deny a person access to marriage, a fundamental right, solely on the basis
of race are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 11. The Court
reasoned that because classifications based solely on race are suspect, they are
entitled to the “most rigid scrutiny” and if these laws are upheld, they must be shown
to be necessary to achieve some legitimate state interest beyond the intent to carry
out a racist political agenda. Id.
72
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court upheld an executive
order that forced Japanese Americans into internment camps following World War
II on the ground that the order passed muster under strict scrutiny. Id, at 219. The
Court recognized that government actions that classify individuals solely based on
their national origin are inherently suspect; however, the order was justified by a
compelling government interest to prevent espionage and sabotage. Id. at 227.
73
Pollvogt, supra note 70, at 742.
74
Id.
75
Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on
Sexual Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53 J. SEX. RSCH.
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basis of a suspect classification, the Court will only uphold the statute
or government practice if the statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.”76 When state action infringes on a
fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny even if the affected
group is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class.77 The Supreme Court is
responsible for identifying what constitutes a fundamental right
requiring strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.78 The
Supreme Court has used two methods to identify fundamental rights.
First, the rights stated explicitly in the Constitution, including the Bill
of Rights, are fundamental rights. 79 Second, implicit rights can be
found using the “concept of ordered liberty” or in the “history and
traditions of American people.”80 Strict scrutiny review has famously
been coined as “‘strict’ in theory, and fatal in fact” because it is rare
that the government will be able to justify the suspect classification
under strict scrutiny’s high burden.81
The next classifications recognized by the Court are semisuspect or quasi-suspect classifications. Gender and illegitimacybased classifications
are semi-suspect or
quasi-suspect
82
classifications, and will be upheld only if the government action
meets intermediate scrutiny. 83 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the
government must show that the action that discriminates based on sex 84

1,
18
(2016),
https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=scholarship.
76
Pollvogt, supra note 70, at 744.
77
Norris & Turk, supra note 64, at 402.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. Fundamental rights are mostly limited to voting rights and access to the judicial
process, but the Court has found fundamental rights in other legal doctrines and has
named reproductive freedom, the right to marriage for homosexual and heterosexual
couples, the right to file for divorce, the right to obtain contraception, the right to
privacy, and the freedom to raise and educate children. Id.
81
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
82
The Court held that government classifications that distinguish groups based on
whether they were born to married parents or an unmarried, single parent were
subject to intermediate scrutiny because illegitimate persons’ birth status has no
relationship with their ability to perform in society. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977).
83
Galloway, supra note 60, at 125.
84
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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or illegitimacy85 is substantially related to the achievement of an
important government purpose.86
Courts historically applied
intermediate scrutiny to determine whether government action
categorizes people based on gender stereotypes instead of an
individual’s capability.87
All other classifications that remain are deemed non-suspect
classifications and the court will only strike down the statute if the
challenger can show that the government action does not meet rational
basis review.88 Rational basis review is the most deferential standard
applied by courts in the equal protection framework and only requires
that a government action is rationally related to achieving a legitimate
government interest.89 Rational basis rarely invalidates legislation; the
Court has only struck down laws as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment under rational basis seventeen times out of over one
hundred challenges.90
IV.

THE HISTORY OF THE OPPRESSION OF THE LGBTQ+
COMMUNITY
A.

Before World War II

Most scholars agree that the gay and lesbian rights movement
began in the 1950s; however earlier developments beginning as early
as British Colonial America influenced the beginning of a full-fledged
gay rights movement.91
Same-sex sexual relationships were
commonly practiced before and after the Europeans arrived in North
America and political and religious leaders viewed them as a crime and
a sin.92 At this point in history, people did not view themselves as
either “heterosexual” or “homosexual” but rather viewed sex as an act
and not an identity.93 In the early nineteenth century, many scientists

85

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
87
Norris & Turk, supra note 64, at 404-05.
88
Id. at 405.
89
Id. at 402.
90
Raphael Holosyzc- Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When
Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2015).
91
MARC STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 13 (2012).
92
Id.
93
Id.
86
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argued that queer people suffered from a defect or disease. 94 As a
result of growing oppression and othering by the majority of society, a
growing number of queer people began to view themselves as a distinct
community with unique gender and sexual identities. 95 By the early
twentieth century, sexual communities in many locations around the
country were filled with people of diverse sexual preferences who
began to see their sexual identities as core components of their
identities.96
In the early English colonies, non-reproductive sex was seen as
a threat.97 People engaging in homoerotic relationships outside of
marriage faced harsh criminal penalties.98 Those found guilty of these
“crimes” could face punishments including fines, jailing, whippings,
or a death sentence. 99 Some jurisdictions even adopted criminal
penalties for those who engaged in “cross-dressing.”100 In the 1840s,
a New York newspaper launched a hateful attack on the city’s
“sodomites,” who are the modern equivalent of gay French, English,
Portuguese, and Jewish male immigrants. 101 The articles portrayed
these men as savage, violent, and sex-crazed predators looking to
destroy “men of respectability” into “victims of extortion.” 102
After the Civil War, queer communities grew larger and queer
people began to envision themselves as members of a minority group
in society as sexual orientation became an increasingly central trait to
one’s identity.103 Writers and artists began to represent queer people
and culture in their works, which brought the life and experiences of
queer people to the forefront of the public eye. 104 In response, medical
doctors increasingly classified and encouraged society to treat queer
people as mentally ill. 105 Oppression against queer communities
continued to grow as most states criminalized sodomy by the 1880s
and 1890s with many states still using capital punishment for sodomy
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 17.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 19.
101
Id. at 20.
102
Id. at 21.
103
Id. at 22.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 23.
95
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into the mid-1860s.106 While sodomy charges were difficult to
prosecute, states continued to target queer communities by enforcing
laws against disorderly conduct, lewdness, loitering, solicitation,
vagrancy, and cross-dressing that expressly targeted queer people. 107
The federal government deported immigrants identified as “sexual
perverts” if convicted of any of the aforementioned crimes.108
Penalties for same-sex sex related crimes included not only fines and
prison sentences, but forced sterilization, castration, and
institutionalization.109 Attitudes towards the queer community stayed
consistent with little to no major advocacy groups forming until after
the Second World War.110
B.

Post-World War II

After the end of World War II, queer communities became
increasingly visible to non LGBT+ communities because queer life
made its way into mainstream pop culture in blues music and
theater.111 The increasing awareness of a vulnerable population in the
post-war era informed Senator Joseph McCarthy’s belief that gay
people constituted security risks to the nation and queer people needed
to be purged from government jobs. 112 President Dwight D.
Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450 which banned all gay
individuals from working for the government in an effort to promote
the national security concerns Senator McCarthy warned about. 113

106

Id. at 26. Laws prohibiting sodomy extended not only to men having sexual
intercourse with other men but to women having sexual intercourse with women and
anyone engaging in oral sex. Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 27.
109
Id.
110
Bonnie J. Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Social
Movements, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/history (last
visited Feb. 22, 2021).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953). Section 8(a)(iii) of
the Executive Order states that “sexual perversion” is fair reason to terminate a
government employee from his or her job. Id. At the time, homosexuality was not
only a crime, but was considered a mental illness as classification in the American
Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual until 1973. Morris, supra note 107.
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In 1965, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) which
provided new legislation outlawing racial discrimination. 114 Directly
following the passage of the CRA, the first gay rights demonstrations
took place in Philadelphia and Washington D.C. 115 Meanwhile in New
York, the State Liquor Authority refused to grant liquor licenses to bars
that served queer people which forced those bars to act as “illegal
saloons.”116 On June 27, 1969, the police arrived at the Stonewall Inn,
a bar frequented by mostly poor, queer people of color, and arrested
thirteen people inside.117 Over the next six days, violent riots ensued
outside the Stonewall Inn. 118 Police sprayed protestors with fire hoses
and arrested individuals by the dozens and the tenacious gay crowd
responded by throwing bricks at law enforcement, smashing windows,
and chanting powerful cries for liberty from the hands of government
sanctioned homophobia.119 Just one year later in 1970, the first gay
pride parades took place in various cities throughout the country. 120
Every year on the last Sunday in June since 1970, almost every major
city in the United States hosts a gay pride parade with New York City’s
parade having the most parade attendees of any kind exceeded only by
the St. Patrick’s Day parade. 121
In the 1970s, the gay rights movement’s attempts to bring
national attention to queer issues were met with staunch suppression
by the revival of conservative movements.122 In 1977, “Save Our
Children,” a conservative anti-gay political group, protested a Florida
ordinance that attempted to prevent discrimination against the queer
community.123 “Save Our Children” was successful and the law was
114

Morris, supra note 110.
Id.
116
Garance Franke-Ruta, An Amazing 1969 Account of the Stonewall Uprising, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/anamazing-1969-account-of-the-stonewall-uprising/272467/.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Erin Blakemore, How the Stonewall Uprising Ignited the Modern LGBTQ Rights
Movement,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(June
26,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/stonewall-uprising-ignitedmodern-lgbtq-rights-movement.
121
Id.
122
LGBTQ Rights Timeline in American History, LGBTQHISTORY
http://www.lgbtqhistory.org/lgbt-rights-timeline-in-american-history/, (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021).
123
Id.
115
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repealed, rolling back protections for queer people in Florida. 124
However, in 1977, Harvey Milk was elected county supervisor in San
Francisco and became the third “out” elected public official in
American history.125 Just one year after his election, Milk was
assassinated by a former city supervisor. 126 Shortly after Milk’s
murder, a California state senator introduced a ballot initiative that
allowed local school districts to ban gay teachers. 127
In 1981, conservatives in Congress proposed the Family
Protection Act which prevented the allocation of federal funds to "any
organization that suggests that homosexuality can be an acceptable
alternative lifestyle." 128 The Act was defeated, despite President
Ronald Reagan’s endorsement. 129 In 1982, the Department of Defense
issued a policy stating that homosexuality is “incompatible” with
military service.130 During the 1980s, the AIDS epidemic reached its
height as infected individuals died at exponential numbers with little
to no intervention from the government. 131 AIDS disproportionately
impacted gay men as compared to straight men and women, which
effectively strengthened the backlash to gay rights movements. 132 In
1986, the Supreme Court turned a blind eye to homophobic
government practices when it upheld a Georgia state law that
criminalized sodomy on the ground that gay couples had no
constitutional right to engage in same-sex sex.133
Government at the federal and local levels from the 1990s until
the present continued to present obstacles to equal treatment under the
124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since 1977, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 28,
2005),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2005/historyanti-gay-movement-1977. The ballot initiative ultimately failed and was never
enacted. Id. The senator who introduced the initiative said that, “One third of San
Francisco teachers are homosexual … I assume most of them are seducing young
boys in toilets.” Id.
128
Family Protection Act, H.R. 311, 97th Cong. (1981).
129
History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since 1977, supra note 127.
130
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTORS: DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD’S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY
16 (1992).
131
JAMIE K. TAYLOR ET AL., THE REMARKABLE RISE OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 29
(2006).
132
Id.
133
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125
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law to the LGBTQ+ community. In 1993, the Clinton Administration
promised to remove the military’s long-term ban on homosexuals that
was formally acknowledged in 1982.134 Instead of improving the
quality of life of queer Americans in the military, Congress passed the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law. 135 As of December 21, 1993,
homosexuals were permitted to serve in the military but shall not “(1)
engage in homosexual acts, (2) state homosexual or bisexual
preferences or (3) attempt to marry or marry an individual of the same
sex” and any violation of these provisions will result in discharge from
the military.136 In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) which prohibited any state from respecting a marriage
between members of the same sex. 137 In 2018, former President Trump
issued a Presidential Memorandum that disqualified transgender
individuals from military service on the grounds that they are
psychologically and physically unfit to serve. 138 Since President
Biden’s Inauguration in January of 2021, the Biden Administration has
taken care to roll back anti-LGBTQ+ policies from previous
administrations and provide subsequent protections to LGBTQ+
individuals.139 President Biden issued Executive Order 14004 that
revokes Trump’s 2018 Presidential Memorandum and declares that
“gender identity should not be a bar to military service.” 140
C.

Conversion Therapy

In 1899, a German psychiatrist, Albert von-Schrenck-Notzing,
announced that he believed he found the cure for homosexuality; he

134

Debra A. Luker, Comment, The Homosexual Law and Policy in the Military:
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass”… Don’t be Absurd! 3
SCHOLAR 267, 286 (2002).
135
Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010).
136
Luker, supra note 134, at 286.
137
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738C(a) (1996)).
138
Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2018 DAILY
COMP. PRESS. DOC (Mar. 23, 2018).
139
President Biden’s Pro-LGBTQ Timeline, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/president-bidens-pro-lgbtq-timeline (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021).
140
Exec. Order No. 14,004, 86 Fed. Reg. 7471 (Jan. 25, 2021).
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could hypnotize a gay man into becoming straight. 141 After forty-five
hypnosis sessions and a trip to the local brothel, he claimed that he
successfully redirected a man’s sexual attraction from men to
women.142 Von-Schreck-Notzing’s theory was the beginning of a
pseudoscientific psychological technique to “cure” homosexuality:
conversion therapy.143
Although modern science explicitly rejects the validity of
conversion therapy today, conversion therapy was widely practiced
throughout the twentieth century 144 and is still practiced by some
providers today.145 Some conversion techniques involved physically
invasive procedures that had lasting irreversible consequences. 146
Nineteenth century endocrinologists believed that a person’s sexuality
was controlled by the hormones one’s sex organs produce, so many
gay men were castrated and given “heterosexual testicles.” 147 Other
psychiatrists performed lobotomies and electro-shock therapy to
permanently alter gay men’s brains in the hopes of making them
straight.148 More common forms of conversion therapy involved less
physically invasive methods, but “therapeutic” measures that were
nonetheless traumatizing 149 and morally reprehensible, including
aversion therapy,150 faith-based conversion therapy, and other “talk”

Erin Blakemore, Gay Conversion Therapy’s Disturbing 19th Century Origins,
HISTORY (June 22, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/gay-conversion-therapyorigins-19th-century.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
About
Conversion
Therapy,
THE
TREVOR
PROJECT,
https://www.thetrevorproject.org/get-involved/trevor-advocacy/50-bills-50states/about-conversion-therapy/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
146
Blakemore, supra note 138.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. Studies have shown that conversion therapy resulted in higher risk for low
self-esteem, treatment-related anxiety, suicidal ideation, relationship dysfunction,
and impotence. AMERICAN PSYCH. ASSOC., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC
RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION. 41-42 (2009).
150
Blakemore, supra note 141. The goal of aversion therapy was for queer people to
associate homosexuality with pain or disgust. Id. Providers would force queer people
to look at photos of their partners while ingesting chemicals that made them vomit
or were forced to look at queer pornography while receiving electric shocks to their
bare genitals. Id.
141
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methods.151 Many providers tried to convince queer people that their
attraction towards the same sex is a product of childhood abuse and
trauma that may or may not have actually existed. 152
Modern science has fully rejected conversion therapy as either
effective or ethically appropriate, so licensed mental health providers
do not attempt to change a person’s sexual orientation.153 Fortunately,
twenty state legislatures, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
passed laws that prohibit the practice of conversion therapy for queer
youth.154
D.

Housing Discrimination against Queer Persons

Housing discrimination is a pervasive and persistent problem
for queer people. In a 2015 survey, seventy-three percent of queer
people reported fearing housing discrimination. 155 A 2017 study
showed that gay men searching for housing were informed about fewer
units and given higher quoted rental fees than their straight
counterparts.156 A Michigan study also showed that twenty-seven
percent of the time, renters showed a preference for heterosexual
couples by offering those couples lower rates, waived or lower
application fees, and rigorously encouraging those couples to apply
compared to queer couples. 157 Many queer people report being told by
landlords that they do not, and will not, rent to a gay person because
they do not support the “gay lifestyle” or “their kind” at this rental
unit.158 Landlords reason that queer people and couples in the
neighborhood may disrupt the “low profile” community aesthetic
because queer tenants’ “unique relationships” are distracting and

151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-lies-and-dangersof-reparative-therapy (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
155
2015 LGBT Home Buyer and Seller Survey, NAT’L ASSOC. OF GAY & LESBIAN
REAL
ESTATE
PROF.,
1,
17
(2015),
https://naglrep.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/naglrep-lgbt-survey-2015.pdf.
156
Rigel C. Olivieri, Article, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination
Claims Under the Fair Housing Act After Bostock v. Clayton County, 69 U. KAN. L.
REV. 409, 412 (2021).
157
Id. at 412.
158
Id. at 428.
152
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invasive.159 Rates of housing discrimination are even higher for
transgender individuals, queer people of color, and queer women.160
Additionally, only twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
provide statutory protections for queer people against housing
discrimination.161 Twenty-one states and five territories have
absolutely no protections for housing discrimination based on sexual
orientation.162
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) with
the purpose to provide for “fair housing throughout the United
States.”163 The FHA makes it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent to a
purchaser “because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.”164 Until the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock v.
Clayton County165 that held that the provision, “because of sex” in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, included protections to sexual orientation
and transgender status, 166 it was not clear whether sexual orientation
was a protected category in Civil Rights statutes.167 The Fair Housing
Act includes similar language as the Civil Rights Act in regard to sex,
namely the provision, “because of sex,” but the Court has yet to
determine whether the holding in Bostock extends to similar statutes
like the Fair Housing Act. 168 Members of Congress have tried to
remedy the problems facing queer people’s ability to find housing by
introducing The Equality Act multiple times, but the Act has never
successfully passed. 169 The Equality Act attempted to provide federal
protections for queer people in housing, but the bill was unsuccessful
in Congress.170 More recently in 2019, the House of Representatives
introduced the Fair and Equal Housing Act which would explicitly
159

Id.
Id. at 413.
161
Non-Discrimination Laws, LGBT MAP, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/non_discrimination_laws, (current as of Apr. 29, 2021).
162
Id.
163
Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-204, §801, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as 42
U.S.C. §3601).
164
Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-204, §804, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as 42
U.S.C. §3604(a-e)).
165
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
166
Id. at 1741.
167
Id. at 1738.
168
Olivieri, supra note 156, at 409-10.
169
Id. at 414; see generally, H.R. 1447, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1328, 115th Cong.
(2017).
170
Olivieri, supra note 156, at 414.
160
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protect queer people by adding “sexual orientation” to the Fair
Housing Act, but the Act has never made it out of committee in both
the House and the Senate. 171
Congress’s unwillingness to
affirmatively protect queer people in the fight for fair housing by
blatantly ignoring these bills is yet another example of the queer
communities’ long history of oppression.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO DEFINING SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AS A CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

To date, the Supreme Court has yet to determine what standard
of review should apply to sexual-orientation related cases.172
Recently, the Supreme Court recognized that under the Equal
Protection Clause same-sex couples are entitled to the fundamental
right to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.173 However, the Court in
Obergefell did not use a traditional equal protection analysis to hold
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.174 Marriage
equality resolves a plethora of legal issues facing same-sex couples,
but sexual minorities face a whole host of legal issues that require the
Court to definitively establish a consistent standard under the Equal
Protection Clause.175 Before discussing the advantages of adopting
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, it is beneficial to first
discuss Supreme Court jurisprudence on sexual orientation and the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court first considered a statute that discriminated
on the basis of sexual orientation in Bowers v. Hardwick. 176 In Bowers,
the Court upheld a statute that created criminal liability for those who
engaged in same-sex sexual intercourse or encounters on the ground
that homosexual couples had no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy.177 The District Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim on the ground that a statute prohibiting
171

H.R. 2402, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1246 116th Cong. (2019).
Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal
Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 493, 495 (2015).
173
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 655 (2015).
174
Sobel, supra note 172, at 495.
175
Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) (repealed 2010).
176
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177
Id. at 190-91.
172
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sodomy did not violate the Constitution. 178 The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the state statute violated respondent’s
fundamental right to privacy because the practice of sodomy is a
“private and intimate” activity that is “beyond the reach of state
regulation.”179 The Court explained that that the Court of Appeals
incorrectly applied the right to privacy in one’s home and failed to
consider whether homosexual people have a fundamental right to
engage in sodomy.180 The Court declined to extend the fundamental
right to marry and raise children to queer Americans, because it did not
see a connection between homosexual activity and marriage and
procreation.181 Because the right to engage in sodomy is not a
fundamental right, the law prohibiting sodomy must only be justified
by a “rational basis for the law.” 182 The Court in Bowers explained
that the moral opposition to sodomy by a majority of the electorate in
Georgia constituted a legitimate government interest in enacting a
statute to prohibit its practice. 183 The Court reasoned that because most
laws are based on the notion of morality, if all laws representing moral
conflicts are to be invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment, most
laws would not survive. 184 It then would be unreasonable to strike
down laws on this ground.185
In Romer v. Evans,186 the Court held that an amendment to a
state constitution that denied legal protections to homosexual and
bisexual people violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
Amendment is not related to any legitimate government purpose. 187
Romer was the first case to safeguard the rights of sexual minorities.
However, Romer did not add anything to determine if sexual
orientation as a classification under the equal protection clause
requires a different degree of constitutional scrutiny. 188 Romer instead
merely applied a pre-existing standard of scrutiny: the rational basis
178

Id. at 188.
Id. at 189.
180
Id. at 190.
181
Id. at 191.
182
Id. at 196.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
187
Id. at 635.
188
Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal
Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 493, 505 (2015).
179
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test for non-suspect classifications that invalidate a state’s
constitutional amendment if it lacks any legitimate government
purpose.189
The Court in Romer analyzed precedent regarding non-suspect
classes and the Equal Protection Clause and concluded that if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
Court shall uphold the law “so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.”190 In this case, the state of Colorado in 1992
adopted an amendment by referendum that prohibited “all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect” LGBTQ+ identifying groups in response to
growing city ordinances that banned discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.191 On appeal, the Court found no rational
relationship between the classification adopted and the amendment
because it was both too narrow and too broad. 192 Additionally, the
Court found that the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest. 193
In 2003, the Supreme Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v.
194
Texas.
The Court in Lawrence held that there was no rational basis
for a criminal statute that prohibited consensual sodomy.195 However,
the Court analyzed this case not under an Equal Protection analysis,
but under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 196
The doctrine of “substantive due process” prevents states from
infringing on fundamental liberty interests unless the state can show
the infringement is narrowly tailored to a compelling government

189

Id.
517 U.S. at 631. The Court did not discuss whether sexual orientation is a suspect
class and thus entitled to heightened scrutiny, and automatically denoted sexual
orientation as a non-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
191
Id. at 623.
192
Id. at 633. The Court noted that a law may still be rationally related to a legitimate
government end even if the law “seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group, or the rationale for it seems tenuous.” Id. However, the amendment
in this case cannot even satisfy this minimal standard because of the underinclusive
and broad nature of the amendment; the amendment identified persons by a single
trait and then denied them any and all protections under the law pursuant to that one
trait, which the Court found to be unprecedented. Id.
193
Id. at 635 (citing Dep’t of Agric., v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
194
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
195
Id. at 586.
196
Id. at 564.
190
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interest.197 The Court in Lawrence rejected the majority’s reasoning
in Bowers that upheld a criminal statute prohibiting sodomy based on
moral opposition to homosexuality. 198 The Court held that the moral
opposition to sodomy by some percentage of the community does
allow the state to force those views on the public at large by
criminalizing sodomy and effectively limiting a group’s freedom. 199
Instead, individual decisions by married couples concerning the
private details of their sexual relationship even when not intended for
reproduction are a form of liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause.200 The Court recognized that all individuals are entitled to the
fundamental right to privacy 201 in their private lives and the state
cannot “control their destiny by making their private life a crime.” 202
In 2013, the Supreme Court again considered a law that
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in United States v.
Windsor.203 In Windsor, the Court struck down the Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) on the ground that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it prevented an entire class of people, samesex married couples, from having access to the benefits of a legally
recognized marriage. 204 Congress passed DOMA before state
legislatures could legalize same-sex marriage.205 DOMA excluded a
same-sex partner from the definition of “spouse” in all federal
statutes.206 The Respondent, Edith Windsor, and her wife were
lawfully married in Ontario, Canada but lived in New York which
recognized their Ontario marriage as a valid one. 207 Windsor wanted
to claim her late wife’s estate under the estate tax exemption for
surviving spouses.208 Because of DOMA, Windsor could not claim the
marital exemption from the federal estate tax which excludes from
197

Id. at 593.
Id. at 570.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 578 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
201
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing a fundamental
right to privacy in marital relationships); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that a woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy pursuant
to the right to privacy found implicitly in the constitution).
202
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
203
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
204
Id. at 775.
205
Id. at 752.
206
Id. at 753.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 750.
198
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taxation “any interest in property which passes or has passed from the
decedent to his surviving spouse. 209 The Court first recognized that
the states have the power to create their own laws governing marriages
in their own state and the federal government typically does not reach
into this traditional state power. 210
At the time of the Respondent’s wife’s death in 2009, New
York recognized same-sex marriages from other states and later
legalized marriages made within the state in 2011. 211 DOMA sought
to invalidate and injure the very class New York intended to protect
when it recognized and then allowed same-sex marriage in the state,
violating Equal Protection principles. 212 Relying on U.S. Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno,213 the Court held that at the very least, the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from implementing
statutes with the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group to
which that desire is motivated by animus or hatred. 214 Such a
problematic intention cannot be deemed a legitimate government
purpose and fails to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause.215
The cases where the Court considered sexual orientation under
the Equal Protection Clause resulted in the Court’s defending the
LGBTQ+ community by striking down discriminatory statutes that
denied individuals equal protection under the law solely because of
whom they love. While the Court’s decisions have substantially
helped the LGBTQ+ community, the Court has failed to identify
classifications based on sexual orientation as suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications subject to strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny.
In Windsor, the Court could have considered whether queer people
constituted a suspect class, but instead the Court simply invalidated
DOMA as a product of animus directed towards same-sex couples: a
well-established framework used regularly on non-suspect classes.216
The Court has never considered the merits of an argument for
classifying sexual orientation as a suspect classification even though
209

Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2018)).
Id. at 768.
211
Id. at 769.
212
Id.
213
413 U.S 528 (1973).
214
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
215
Id.
216
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians,
Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 977 (2014).
210
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the history of systemic oppression of queer people in the United States
meets all the criteria required to constitute a suspect class discussed in
Section II of this Note.217
VI.

RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION
A.

Discrete and Insular Minority

Suspect classifications under the Equal Protection Clause
originate from the seminal case, United States v. Carolene Products,218
previously discussed in Section III of this Note.219 Paragraph three of
Carolene Products requires heightened constitutional scrutiny for
legislation that appears, on its face, to target particular religious,
national, racial groups, or prejudice directed at “discrete and insular
minorities” that have the effect of “curtail[ing] the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”220
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,221 the
Supreme Court held that a “discrete and insular” group is one that
demands “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”222 Additionally, a “discrete and insular” group is subjected
to purposeful and systemic unequal treatment rendering it politically
unpopular and politically powerless. 223 Building on Murgia, Professor
Bruce Ackerman champions a more descriptive definition for the
phrase, “discrete and insular minority.” 224 A group is “discrete” if its
members are “relatively easy for others to identify” and a group is

217

Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
739, 742 (2014).
218
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
219
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
220
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
221
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
222
Id. at 313 (holding that a state law that required police officers to retire at age fifty
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the right of government
employment was not fundamental, and the law was rationally related to a legitimate
public interest in maintaining a physically competent police force).
223
Id.
224
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 729 (1985).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 11

310

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

“insular” if its members readily and frequently interacts with one
another in a variety of social contexts. 225
The queer community is certainly a discrete and insular
minority as queer people are only 5.6% of the American population. 226
Queer Americans are especially discrete and insular compared to racial
minorities, where the number of Americans of color more than doubles
that of queer Americans totaling up to: 13.4% Black, 18.5% Hispanic
or Latino, 5.9% Asian, and 1.5% Native, Alaska Native, Hawaiian, or
Pacific Islander. 227
At first glance, a person’s “queerness” is not automatically
discernable simply from looking at a person, the way a person’s race
is more easily discernible. One’s sexual orientation is an internally
held trait and not a physical trait making it difficult to always know if
a person is queer or straight. However, the queer community still fits
within Professor Ackerman’s definition for discrete and insular
because queer culture is full of identifying characteristics such as
dress, speech patterns, language, and overall appearance that make it
easier for others to know or assume that another person is queer. 228
Studies show that queer people commonly alter their appearance after
coming out to conform with known queer stereotypes and trends to
make themselves easily identifiable to other queer people. 229 Lesbian
or queer women often embrace a more masculine appearance by
limiting their use of cosmetic products, cutting their hair short, and
wearing androgynous or masculine clothing. 230 Gay or queer men
225

Id. at 726.
Jeffrey M. Jones, LGBT Identification Rises to 5.6% in the Latest U.S. Estimate,
GALLUP (Feb. 24, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/329708/lgbt-identificationrises-latest-estimate.aspx.
227
United
States
Census
Bureau,
QuickFacts,
CENSUS.GOV,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 (last visited Mar. 29,
2021).
228
Nicholas O. Rule, Perceptions of Sexual Orientation from Minimal Cues, 46
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 129 (2017).
229
Id. at 130.
230
See id. There is a plethora of other identifying non-verbal cues that queer people
use or adapt that signal a queer identity. See id. at 130-32. The most common cue
that conveys sexual orientation is through the way a person speaks. Id. Queer people
commonly pronounce letters and consonants differently than their straight
counterparts, most notably: the “gay lisp” where gay men frequently lisp more than
straight men on the consonant, /s/. Id. at 131. Gay men also are statistically more
likely to have a higher pitched voice than that of straight males. Id. While the debate
over speech differences between queer and heterosexual individuals is elusive in that
226
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similarly distinguish themselves by “donning particular styles of
clothing and grooming to signal their affiliation within subgroups of
gay culture [such as] ‘leather-men’ and ‘bears.’”231 Gay and queer
men may also dress more stereotypically feminine compared to their
straight male counterparts.232 While these identifying characteristics
were originally adopted for queer people to signal to other queer people
that they are interested in same-sex relationships,233 non-queer people
are also familiar with these identifying non-verbal cues and use this
information in a myriad of ways.234 Studies show that people often
unconsciously process assumptions about a person’s sexual orientation
based on these cues and unintentionally force stereotypes and
heteronormative ideals on queer people to the queer community’s
detriment.235 Although sexual orientation is not an overt physical trait
like race or sometimes gender, a person’s style, personality, speech,
and language signal their belonging to the queer community, allowing
them to be easily identifiable to the community at large, which in turn
makes them a discrete and insular minority.
Members of the Court have historically recognized queer
people as part of an insular minority in the United States for decades,
even though a majority of the Court has yet to hold that sexual
orientation is a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment. 236
Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that severe criticism targeted at
publicly “out” queer people render those individuals politically
powerless to “pursue their rights openly in the political arena.” 237
Although a majority of the Court has never adopted Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall’s interpretation of suspect classifications as
applied to sexual orientation, the Court has interpreted the “discrete
and insular” analysis to limit the government from using certain
personality traits as a means of classification, “when these traits are

it is unclear exactly what makes speech vary amongst queer and straight individuals,
there is robust support that one’s speech conveys their sexual orientation. Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 135.
235
Id.
236
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dis., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237
Id.
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irrelevant to a person’s capabilities to contribute to society.” 238 A
person’s sexual orientation has no bearing on the ability to function in
society in any way, and thus, classifications based on sexual
orientation are arbitrary and have no other purpose other than to make
the lives of queer people more difficult.
Early Equal Protection cases centered their analysis on whether
a particular group was or was not a “discrete and insular” minority. 239
Today, courts have begun using other factors such as political
powerlessness, history of discrimination, and immutability to
determine whether a group was a “discrete and insular minority”
deserving of heightened scrutiny. 240 The modern approach allows for
courts to determine a group’s “suspectness” with greater precision to
more successfully implement the spirit and theory of Footnote Four: to
require heightened scrutiny for laws that burden discrete and insular
minorities.241
B.

The Queer Community Has Suffered a History of
Discrimination

Classifications that the Court has deemed to be suspect are
classifications based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. 242 When
governments make classifications based on race, ethnicity or national
origin, the groups targeted by the classification, mainly people of
238

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A plurality of the Court recognized
sex as a suspect class and a concurrence of four Justices refused to extend strict
scrutiny to sex, but the sex-based classification in this case should be overruled
pursuant to precedent in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Frontiero, the Court
considered a case where a married female Air Force officer sought to obtain
government benefits for her husband if she claimed him as a dependent. Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 678. Under federal law, a man could claim his wife as a dependent
“without regard to whether she is in fact dependent” on him financially, but a woman
could claim her husband only if she sufficiently proved that her husband relies on
her for one-half of his support. Id. The question before the Court was whether the
difference in treatment of the two groups based only on sex violates the Due Process
Clause. Id.; See also Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution:
Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
143, 153 (1988).
239
Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
149 (2011).
240
Id. at 150.
241
Id.
242
See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/11

30

Covais: Baby, We Were Born This Way

2022

BABY, WE WERE BORN THIS WAY

313

color, have suffered a history of discrimination. 243 Black and brown
Americans have suffered a terrible history of discrimination since the
nation’s inception beginning with the slave trade and continuing to the
modern day with ever-present police brutality targeted at black
Americans.244 Courts have struggled with determining whether a
group has the “requisite history of discrimination” because courts must
compare the present group’s history with the experience of Americans
of color and immigrants.245 The Court has never announced another
suspect class in part because in the eyes of the Court no other group’s
history has sufficiently compared to the experience of marginalized
racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups. 246 While not as visible, the queer
community has also sustained a history of prolonged discrimination. 247
State authorized discrimination targeted at queer people persists to this
day as many state legislatures continue to advance bills that target
queer people directly, and allow for religious exemptions that
effectively target queer people and their right to fully participate in
society.248
Congress passed The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) in 1993 in order to prevent states from substantially
burdening religious practice without a compelling governmental
interest.249 Governments can only burden religion if the law is the least
243

Strauss, supra note 239, at 150.
Meilan Solly, 158 Resources to Understand Racism in America, SMITHSONIAN
MAG, (June 4, 2020, 11:47 AM), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/158resources-understanding-systemic-racism-america-180975029/.
245
Strauss, supra, note 239, at 151-52.
246
Id.
247
See generally supra Section IV.
248
American Civil Liberties Union, Past Legislation Affecting LGBT Rights Across
the Country 2020, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/past-legislation-affecting-lgbtrights-across-country-2020 (Last updated Mar. 20, 2020).
249
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(2)(a)(3) (2018). Congress
passed RFRA with the intent of restricting the application and force of the Court’s
decision in Emp. Div. Dep’t. of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See David
Schultz, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated, Sept. 2017), https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1092/religious-freedom-restoration-act-of1993#:~:text=Congress%20adopted%20the%20Religious%20Freedom,First%20A
mendment%20free%20exercise%20clause. In Smith, the Court effectively
eliminated the need for strict scrutiny review on government actions that burden
religion and instead, held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate
the First Amendment. Id. In response to Smith, Congress enacted RFRA to restore
the “strict scrutiny” test used in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
244
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restrictive means to achieving that interest. 250 Just four years after
Congress passed RFRA, the Court held that Congress only had
authority to extend RFRA to federal laws and that applying RFRA to
the states exceeded Congress’s authority. 251 In response to the Court’s
holding, state legislatures passed their own versions of RFRA to
effectively allow for any entity to refuse public services to anyone,
based on religious objections. 252 The state versions of RFRA are
substantially broader, and allow for any institution, even private
restaurants, bakeries, or other business organization to refuse service
to queer people on the ground that their religious beliefs prohibit them
from supporting queer “lifestyles.” 253 These state bills have the
potential to be deadly or life altering to queer people because they may
even allow for doctors and medical providers to refuse abortion
services, birth control, adoption services, and patient referrals just
because a patient is queer. 254 Anti-LGBTQ+ advocacy groups fund
legislators campaigns throughout the country and lobby their offices to
adopt anti-queer legislation under the guise of religious freedom. 255
A history of discrimination is important to determine a group’s
suspect status because it is an indicator of a group’s political power
and helps courts determine whether the political branches of
government have failed to protect the group. 256 If a group suffers a
history of discrimination, its relationship with the political process is
tarnished in two ways. First, because the group is socially despised
and politically unpopular, they may have not been able to form
coalitions with other advocacy groups to garner support for legislation
and initiatives to improve their quality of life. 257 The queer community
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). RFRA ensured that strict scrutiny, not
rational basis, would be the applicable standard of review to determine whether
burdens on religion are constitutional. See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb(2)(b)(1).
250
42 U.S.C. 2000bb(2)(a)(3).
251
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
252
Arielle P. Schwartz, Discrimination Masquerading as Religious Freedom is a
Slippery Slope that Hurts Everyone, NAT’L. LGBTQ TASK FORCE,
https://www.thetaskforce.org/discrimination-masquerading-as-religious-freedomis-a-slippery-slope-that-hurts-everyone/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
‘RELIGIOUS LIBERTY’ AND THE ANTI-LGBT RIGHT, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Spring
2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/splc_religious_liberty_and_antilgbt_right.pdf.
256
Strauss, supra note 239, at 150.
257
Id. at 151.
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was not recognized as a distinct minority with unique challenges and
realities until the mid 1950s when LGBTQ+ advocacy groups started
to form.258 Second, legislators themselves may be susceptible to bias
towards historically oppressed groups due to pressure from their
constituents and ongoing cultural norms. 259
Twenty-five state legislatures have adopted minimal
legislation to affirmatively protect queer people.260 The Human Rights
Campaign, a civil rights group, creates an annual “State Equality
Index” where it assesses state efforts to prevent queer discrimination
and gives each state a grade for its performance. 261 The twenty-five
states that have not adopted any or very minimal legislation to protect
queer people have no laws to outlaw conversion therapy, address hate
crimes against queer people, anti-bullying laws, anti-housing
discrimination, and more. 262 States’ hesitation to remedy queer
discrimination stems from a tumultuous history of anti-queer
sentiments throughout American history.
C.

Immutability

The Court has never offered a concise definition of
immutability as a factor in Equal Protection analysis,263 but instead the
immutability criterion has evolved over the years from various
additions to immutability jurisprudence. 264 The Court first established
immutability as a suspect criterion in Frontiero v. Richardson.265 The
Court held that since both sex and race are “immutable characteristic[s]
determined solely by the accident of birth” placing burdens on those
groups solely based on their identification with that immutable trait
violates the premise that “legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility.”266 In Bakke, Justice Brennan described
258

MARC STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 13 (2012).
Strauss, supra note 239, at 151.
260
Carl Smith, 2020 Brought Legislative Progress, Pushback on LGBTQ Issues,
GOVERNING (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.governing.com/now/2020-BroughtLegislative-Progress-Pushback-on-LGBTQ-Issues.html.
261
Id.
262
State Scorecards, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/statescorecards (Last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
263
Nicholas Serafin, In Defense of Immutability, 2020 B.Y.U.L. REV. 275, 280.
264
Id.
265
411 U.S. 677 (1973); see supra note 232.
266
411 U.S. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
259
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an immutable trait as something “which its possessors are powerless
to escape or set aside.”267
In Obergefell,268 Justice Kennedy recognized sexual
orientation as both a “normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”269 The Court reasoned that because sexuality is
immutable, the petitioners had no real choice but to marry a same-sex
partner.270 Justice Kennedy noted the longstanding recognition of the
fundamental right to marry and held that same-sex couples shall be just
as entitled to the right to marry as their heterosexual counterparts. 271
The Court’s holding relied on scientific evidence that sexuality is a
static trait that a person can never change and is born with: just as
individuals cannot change their race or ethnicity. 272 Scientific research
suggests that sexual orientation is not determined by any one factor
and instead results from a culmination of genetic, cultural,
environmental, and biological influences. 273 This means that people
cannot simply “choose” their sexual orientation, but instead are born
with it, and it is likely something predetermined much like someone’s
eye color or skin color. 274 As a result, people are unlikely to be
successful in trying to change their sexual orientation because it is a
predetermined and static characteristic. 275 This is evidenced through
the consistent failure of conversion therapy to change a person’s sexual
orientation.276 Although some participants report that they learned
strategies to ignore their attraction to members of the same-sex and
engage in heterosexual encounters, they rarely report that conversion
therapy “successfully” made them straight. 277
Opponents of heightened scrutiny for queer communities may
argue that sexual orientation is not immutable because studies show
267

Regents of the Univ. Of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
268
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
269
Id. at 661.
270
Id. at 658.
271
Id. at 665.
272
Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on
Sexual Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53 J. SEX. RSCH.
1,
2-3
(2016),
https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=scholarship.
273
Id. at 3-6.
274
Id.
275
Id. at 8.
276
Id.
277
Id.
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that sexual orientation is subject to flexibility and slight change
throughout a person’s life. 278 In longitudinal studies, a significant
number of people report identifying as one sexual orientation earlier
in life, and then when asked again many years later, they report a
different sexuality.279 These slight changes in self-identification can
be attributed to changes in the changing social climate and attitudes
towards queerness, varying life experiences and romantic
relationships, and more.280 In other words, people’s own perception of
their sexuality is subject to change and flexibility over time as the
communities they live in grow to accept or reject queer people, or as
individuals enter and leave romantic relationships. However, the fact
that some people change the labels they give themselves over time as
they experience the world does not detract from the fact that sexual
orientation is still generally static and unchanging for most.281
Courts have also made clear that immutability of a
characteristic is not a necessary component for a group to be a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.282
Instead,
immutability is one factor of many that may help courts determine if a
classification is suspect. In fact, the Court in Graham v. Richardson283
determined that classifications based on alienage were subject to strict
scrutiny just like race and national origin classifications even though
alienage is not an immutable trait. 284 Noncitizens have the opportunity
to no longer be considered “aliens” by applying to become naturalized
citizens.285
D.

Political Powerlessness

The political powerless doctrine is perhaps the most
understudied and under-evaluated element of the suspect classification
doctrine.286 No court has provided a succinct definition of “political
278

Id. at 12.
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id. at 18.
283
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
284
Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
285
Diamond & Rosky, supra note 272, at 19.
286
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Article: “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and
Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975,
978 (2018).
279
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powerlessness” in the equal protection context, which only obfuscates
the understanding and application of the doctrine.287 The Supreme
Court has noted, however, that groups who face “political isolation and
historical mistreatment” such as the poor, 288 mentally disabled,289 the
elderly,290 and undocumented persons 291 do not qualify as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class.292 As previously stated, the Court has never
considered whether sexual orientation ought to constitute a suspect
class. However, Justice Scalia once indicated that he would not vote
in favor of elevating sexual orientation to suspect status because he
believed that queer people have “disproportionate wealth, education,
and political power.”293
Justice Scalia’s belief is entirely misguided. Professor
Ackerman posits that American politics are not defined simply by one,
cohesive majority and one, cohesive minority that work against one
another to gain political influence. 294 Instead, normal politics are
pluralistic: where smaller fractions of groups bargain with one another
to gain mutual support. 295 Some groups, Professor Ackerman calls
them “C-Groups” named after “discrete and insular” groups discussed
in Carolene Products’ Footnote Four, have difficulty striking bargains
287

Id.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that a law that required a
majority voting in a community election to approve of the construction of low-rent
housing did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
289
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that the
denial of a special use permit to a permanent residential facility for the mentally
disabled was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally ill and thus
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
290
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding a police
department’s mandatory retirement provision on the ground that such a classification
based on age survived rational basis review).
291
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a state law that withheld
funding to local school districts that educated undocumented students on the ground
that non-citizens are entitled to the fundamental right to receive an education).
292
Hutchinson, supra note 286, at 992. This premise is not to be confused with the
distinct “history of discrimination” element of the equal protection analysis discussed
in Section 6B of this Note. The “history of discrimination” element speaks to a
systemic, outright, and invidious history of discrimination towards a particular
group, while the “historical mistreatment” discussed in the preceding line of cases
refers to pervasive prejudice among those groups.
293
Id. at 993. See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
294
Bruce Ackerman, Article: Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 71920 (1985).
295
Id. at 995; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
288
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with other groups seeking a coalition. 296 Consequently, C-Groups will
often lose politically, in that they are unable to influence legislation to
be favorable to their needs and demands. 297 Denoting C-Groups as a
suspect class ensures that a court intervenes and defends the C-Group
when the legislative system fails to defend that group initially. 298
The Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Superior
Court have heard cases that purported to raise sexual orientation to a
quasi-suspect or suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny. 299 Both
cases, in sum, held that sexual orientation cannot be a suspect class
because queer people do not lack political power to warrant heightened
constitutional protection.300 Both courts pointed to the growth of local
legislation that sought to legalize domestic partnerships in a given
area.301 The courts suggested that because the queer community was
able to successfully access the legislature in some areas, queer people
cannot possibly be politically powerless.302
These courts greatly overestimate the helpfulness of these bills,
while underestimating the overall lack of federal legislation to legalize
same-sex marriage. The late legalization of same-sex marriage in 2015
in Obergefell,303 and the continuous passage of state RFRA statutes in
a multitude of states signals the governments’ obvious reluctance to
use the political process to assist queer communities.304 There will
never be a group that will have zero political power, as even the
smallest minorities are likely able to influence politics in some way.
Every group can create grassroots lobbying groups, vote in every
single election available to them, and donate to their favorite
politicians in the hopes of seeing at least the slightest favorable results.
If the standard were “complete deprivation of political power” then

296

Id.
Id.
298
Id.
299
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Dean v. D.C., 653 A.2d 307
(D.C. 1995).
300
Dean, 653 A.2d at 350.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
304
Arielle P. Schwartz, Discrimination Masquerading as Religious Freedom is a
Slippery Slope that Hurts Everyone, NAT’L. LGBTQ TASK FORCE,
https://www.thetaskforce.org/discrimination-masquerading-as-religious-freedomis-a-slippery-slope-that-hurts-everyone/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
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virtually no group would ever qualify as this is an impossible standard
to meet.305
It would be unconscionable to posit that queer Americans have
not made any progress in gaining political power over history in
relative terms, as they were never expressly denied the right to vote,
the right to organize, or expressly denied the right to run for office.
However, queer Americans still are disproportionately excluded from
American politics.306 In 2020, eleven openly gay lawmakers were
elected to the 117th Congress.307 While this was the highest number of
queer Congresspeople elected to date, these eleven make up merely
two percent of Congress while the queer population in America is
nearly double at 5.6%.308 In the 2020 state elections, 317 openly queer
candidates ran for office. 309 Of the 237 candidates who survived the
primaries, 149 won their races 310 out of a total of 7,383 available state
legislator seats in the nation 311 resulting in two percent of state
legislature seats being held by queer representatives. Additionally, the
very reluctance of the Supreme Court to afford higher constitutional
protections to queer communities also speaks to queer communities’
systemic lack of political power. As previously stated, the Court has
never considered sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect or suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause and has only recently
extended the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples. Without
heightened constitutional scrutiny, states have historically been
successful in passing anti-LGBTQ laws so long as they meet rational
basis review. Queer interest groups, super-PACs, and individual
advocates alike have been unsuccessful in persuading the Court to
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award more protections for queer Americans: a direct testament to the
continuous political powerlessness of the queer community.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Upon analyzing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and
its exclusion of sexual orientation from the suspect classification
framework, it has become clear that heightened constitutional scrutiny
is needed to protect queer Americans from invidious discrimination.
The existing equal protection framework has made it impossible for
new groups beyond race, ethnicity, and national origin to obtain
suspect classification status even though those groups squarely fit into
the existing equal protection framework. The factors to consider
whether a classification is suspect: discrete and insular, immutability,
history of discrimination, and political powerlessness, apply to sexual
orientation in similar ways the framework has applied to preexisting
suspect classifications.
The growing demand for social justice in the United States for
marginalized groups should serve as an impetus for the Court to finally
take action to protect the LGBTQ+ community when it has historically
been unwilling to do so. States should not be able to pass laws that
treat queer people differently than their straight counterparts without a
compelling reason for doing so just as in the case of racist and
xenophobic legislation. Sexual orientation has no bearing on the
ability to participate in society and should not be a basis for excluding
queer people from the public sphere. The United States may not be
“the land of the free” until the nation’s laws seek to serve the people
evenhandedly. President Obama eloquently said: "When all
Americans are treated as equal, no matter who they are or whom they
love, we are all more free." 312
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